

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	§	
	§	
V.	§	
	§	No. 3:20-cr-32-X (17)
MARCUS DOOLEY,	§	
	§	
Defendant.	§	

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

In an Order Accepting Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge Concerning Plea of Guilty, dated April 22, 2021, United States District Judge Brantley Starr has referred this matter to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for a hearing to determine whether it has been clearly shown that there are exceptional circumstances under 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) why Defendant Marcus Dooley should not be detained under 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2) and whether it has been shown by clear and convincing evidence that Defendant Marcus Dooley is not likely to flee or pose a danger to any other person or the community if released under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b) or (c). *See* Dkt. No. 475.

Background

Defendant is set for sentencing before Judge Starr on August 18, 2021. *See* Dkt. No. 254. “[W]hether a defendant should be released pending trial and whether a defendant should be released pending sentencing or appeal are distinct inquiries

governed by different provisions of the Bail Reform Act.” *United States v. Lee*, 31 F. App’x 151, No. 01-30876, 2001 WL 1747632, at *1 (5th Cir. Dec. 4, 2001).

“The provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3143 govern release pending sentencing or appeal.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(c). 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2) dictates that the Court “shall order that a person who has been found guilty of an offense in a case described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) of subsection (f)(1) of section 3142 and is awaiting imposition or execution of sentence be detained unless – (A)(i) the judicial officer finds there is a substantial likelihood that a motion for acquittal or new trial will be granted; or (ii) an attorney for the Government has recommended that no sentence of imprisonment be imposed on the person; and (B) the judicial officer finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person is not likely to flee or pose a danger to any other person or the community.” 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2).

On November 20, 2020, the undersigned United States magistrate judge released Defendant subject to an Order Setting Conditions of Release. *See* Dkt. No. 271.

“The provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3143 govern release pending sentencing or appeal.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(c). 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2) dictates that the Court “shall order that a person who has been found guilty of an offense in a case described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) of subsection (f)(1) of section 3142 and is awaiting

imposition or execution of sentence be detained unless – (A)(i) the judicial officer finds there is a substantial likelihood that a motion for acquittal or new trial will be granted; or (ii) an attorney for the Government has recommended that no sentence of imprisonment be imposed on the person; and (B) the judicial officer finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person is not likely to flee or pose a danger to any other person or the community.” 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2).

Defendant, as ordered, filed a motion for continued pretrial release in which he identifies the exceptional circumstances under 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) that he contends justify his continued release before his sentencing and in which he addresses whether he is likely to flee or pose a danger to any other person or the community if released under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b) or (c) pending sentencing. *See* Dkt. No. 492.

The Court held a hearing on May 11, 2021 on the matters referred by Judge Scholer, at which Defendant appeared in person and through counsel and the government’s counsel appeared. *See* Dkt. No. 494.

Legal Standards and Analysis

As a preliminary matter, Defendant is subject to mandatory detention under Section 3143(a)(2) because he has, on a guilty plea, now been adjudged guilty of a violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1). *See* Dkt. Nos. 325, 466, & 475. That is “an

offense in a case described in subparagraph (A) ... of subsection (f)(1) of section 3142,” specifically, “an offense for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed in the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.).”

Defendant therefore must be detained pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2) unless he meets the conditions of release set forth in Section 3143(a)(2) or 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c). Release of “a person who has been found guilty of an offense in a case described in [18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(A)] and is awaiting imposition or execution of sentence” requires that “the judicial officer finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person is not likely to flee or pose a danger to any other person or the community.” 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2)(B); *see also United States v. Morrison*, 833 F.3d 491, 506 (5th Cir. 2016) (“The decision to detain Jacqueline after conviction is a common one because of the presumption in favor of detention that attaches to a convicted defendant. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 3143.”); *United States v. Lopez*, 504 F. App’x 297, 298 (5th Cir. 2012) (“A defendant who has been convicted ‘shall ... be detained’ pending sentencing ‘unless the judicial officer finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person is not likely to flee or pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the community if released.’ Thus, there is a presumption against release pending sentencing.” (footnotes omitted)). As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly recognized, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 46(c) and Section 3143(a)(1) impose a burden on a convicted defendant seeking release pending

sentencing to show by clear and convincing evidence that she or he is not a flight risk or a danger to the community. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1); FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(c) (“The burden of establishing that the defendant will not flee or pose a danger to any other person or to the community rests with the defendant.”); *United States v. Lockett*, 549 F. App’x 269 (mem.), No. 13-11097, 2013 WL 6623771, at *1 (5th Cir. Dec. 17, 2013).

Further, Defendant must meet the conditions of release set forth in Section 3143(a)(2)(A) or 3145(c). Defendant cannot, and does not claim that he can, satisfy the Section 3143(a)(2)(A) showing that there is a substantial likelihood that a motion for acquittal or new trial will be granted or that an attorney for the government has recommended that no sentence of imprisonment be imposed on Defendant.

18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) provides that “[a] person subject to detention pursuant to [18 U.S.C. §] 3143(a)(2) or (b)(2), and who meets the conditions of release set forth in [18 U.S.C. §] 3143(a)(1) or (b)(1), may be ordered released, under appropriate conditions, by the judicial officer, if it is clearly shown that there are exceptional reasons why such person’s detention would not be appropriate.” As reflected in the Report and Recommendation Concerning Plea of Guilty [Dkt. No. 466], Section 3145(c) provides an alternative basis for pre-sentencing release under “exceptional circumstances,” so long as Defendant also makes the required showing under Section 3143(a)(1) and 3143(a)(2)(B) – that is, by clear and convincing evidence that Defendant is not likely to flee or pose a danger to the safety of any other person or

the community if released under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b) or 3142(c) pending sentencing. *See United States v. Carr*, 947 F.2d 1239, 1240 (5th Cir. 1991).

The Court finds that Defendant has made the required showing that he is not likely to flee or pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the community if continued on release. As Defendant explains in his motion, he

has no close contacts out of state, has no passport, and has never even been on an airplane. He has no close family, property, or financial interests outside of the Northern District of Texas. He is by no means a flight risk and there is nothing to point to the contrary. There is also no evidence that indicates that he presents any risk to the public if he is continued on pretrial release. On the contrary, all facts point to the opposite – his continued release allows him to take care of his brother, support his daughter, and manage his employees at work and the only way that is possible is by staying right where he is.

....

Mr. Dooley has been on release since November 20, 2020 and has had no problems complying with the conditions expected of him. Last month he was even removed from the random drug testing rotation since he has never failed a test or shown signs of using any substances. Mr. Dooley was appeared every time the court, probation department, or his attorney have asked him to.

Dkt. No. 492 at 2-3.

The issue of Defendant's presentencing release therefore turns on whether "it is clearly shown that there are exceptional reasons why [Defendant's] detention [pending sentencing] would not be appropriate." 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c). In support of that showing, Defendant explains that he

has a brother, Curtis Dooley, who lives with him and is going through a severe medical ordeal currently. He was recently diagnosed with stage 4 colon cancer and has been going through chemotherapy for several weeks. Mr. Dooley's brother relies on him physically as well as financially, in that Mr. Dooley provides a roof over his head, provides for his transportation to and from doctor appointments, and helps with his meals and other day-to-day tasks. They have a friend, Thomas Wilkins, that stays there and helps with Curtis while Mr. Dooley is at work, but the bulk of the responsibility falls on Mr. Dooley. Their parents are deceased and the only other sibling has recently had a heart-attack and is unable to help with Curtis's treatment needs.

Additionally, Mr. Dooley has a 13 year-old daughter whose mother passed away three years ago from an overdose. She lives with her maternal grandmother but Mr. Dooley supports her financially and emotionally. They have a close relationship and she spends weekends with him from the end of school on Friday to the start of school on Monday.

....

Mr. Dooley has had the same full-time job at Nvent for eight (8) years. He is the second shift warehouse lead – that means he runs the shipping side of the warehouse. He was finally able to purchase a home in 2019 and has been paying the mortgage ever since – he has no property outside of Dallas county.

He also has some significant health issues himself. He has type 2 diabetes, high blood pressure, sleep apnea, and has had his thyroid removed due to Grave's disease. He takes 5 oral prescription medications each day as well as an injection. He sleeps with a CPAP device every night to assist in breathing and will be required to do so for the rest of his life.

Dkt. No. 492 at 1-2.

The government does “not take a position on whether the COVID-19 Pandemic establishes an ‘exceptional reason’ under 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c); instead, the government will defer to the Court on this issue.” Dkt. No. 198 at 9.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has explained that the “exceptional reasons” provision “was added to § 3145(c) with the mandatory detention provisions of § 3143(a)(2) and (b)(2) and was apparently designed to provide an avenue for exceptional discretionary relief from those provisions.” *Carr*, 947 F.2d at 1240. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit offers a working definition of “exceptional reasons”: “a unique combination of circumstances giving rise to situations that are out of the ordinary.” *United States v. DiSomma*, 951 F.2d 494, 497 (2d Cir. 1991). That court also explained that, in assessing reasons proffered as the basis for release under Section 3145(c), “a case by case evaluation is essential.” *Id.* The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has similarly explained that “‘exceptional’ means ‘clearly out of the ordinary, uncommon, or rare.’” *United States v. Little*, 485 F.3d 1210, 1211 (8th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). One court has explained that, “to avoid emasculating the mandatory detention statute[,] ‘exceptional reasons review is limited to determining whether remanding the defendant to custody until sentencing would be tantamount to subjecting individuals to unjust detention.’” *United States v. Thomas*, No. 10-cr-229, 2010 WL 3323805, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 20, 2010) (quoting *United States v. Christman*, 712 F. Supp. 2d 651, 655 (E.D. Ky. 2010)).

District courts in this circuit have noted a variety of circumstances that do not rise to the level of exceptional. *See United States v. Cyrus*, No. 10-0228-04, 2010 WL 5437247, at *1-*2 (W.D. La. Dec. 27, 2010) (need to “secure his home and attend to other personal matters” were not exceptional reasons justifying release pending

sentencing); *United States v. Douglas*, 824 F. Supp. 98, 99-100 (N.D. Tex. 1993) (defendant's cooperation with the government that subjected him to potential retaliation by co-defendants and his attempts at rehabilitation did not constitute exceptional reasons); *United States v. Dempsey*, No. 91-098, 1991 WL 255382, at *1-*2 (E.D. La. Nov. 19, 1991) (poor health, emotional and mental problems, and need to properly prepare his business and his family for his long absence were not exceptional circumstances); *United States v. Scott*, No. 1:95-CR-80-1, 1995 WL 723752, at *1-*2 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 22, 1995) (need to assist parent was a purely personal reason that was no more exceptional than those routinely rejected by courts); *see also United States v. Landry*, No. CR 15-32-JWD-SCR, 2015 WL 5202458, at *2-*4 (M.D. La. Sept. 4, 2015); *United States v. Posada*, 109 F. Supp. 3d 911, 912-16 (W.D. Tex. 2015).

The facts that Defendant urges as exceptional circumstances, including his compliance with his conditions of pretrial release, are certainly commendable. But the Court determines – as have many other courts when presented with similar arguments for presentencing release – that Defendant's proffered reasons for continuing his release do not individually give rise to a situation that is out of the ordinary.

But the Court determines that all of the circumstances that Defendant asserts are, taken together at this point in time, a unique combination of circumstances giving rise to a situation that is out of the ordinary. Among other circumstances, Defendant presents what the Court believes to be valid health- and family-care-related concerns

that, combined with this compliance to date, including his steady employment, amount to a situation in which Defendant's detention pending his sentencing hearing in three months in August 2021 would not be appropriate.

Conclusion

The Court finds that Defendant Marcus Dooley has presented so unique a combination of circumstances that is so clearly out of the ordinary, uncommon, or rare as to justify ordering release pending sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) and that Defendant Marcus Dooley met his burden to clearly show exceptional circumstances why he should not be detained pending sentencing – that is, exceptional reasons why his detention would not be appropriate – and to show by clear and convincing evidence that he is not likely to flee or pose a danger to any other person or the community if she remains on release under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c). Defendant Marcus Dooley is ORDERED to remain on release, subject to the Court's Order Setting Conditions of Release [Dkt. No. 271], pending his sentencing before Judge Starr.

SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 11, 2021

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'D. Horan', written over a horizontal line.

DAVID L. HORAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE